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      UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
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                                             17 Cr. 548 (JMF)
                 V.
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     JOSHUA ADAM SCHULTE,
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                    Defendant.
                                              Conference
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                                              New York, N.Y.
                                              December 20, 2021
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                                              2:30 p.m.
     Before:
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                           HON. JESSE M. FURMAN,
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                                              District Judge
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                                APPEARANCES
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      DAMIAN WILLIAMS
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          United States Attorney for the
           Southern District of New York
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     BY: DAVID W. DENTON JR.
          Assistant United States Attorney
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      SABRINA P. SHROFF
     DEBORAH A. COLSON
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           Standby Counsel
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     Also Present: Daniel Hartenstine, CISO
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(Case called)

MR. DENTON: Good afternoon, your Honor. David Denton, for the government.

THE COURT: Good afternoon, Mr. Denton.

THE DEFENDANT: Josh Schulte, appearing pro se.

MS. SHROFF: Good afternoon, your Honor. Sabrina Shroff and Debra Colson, standby counsel.

THE COURT: Good afternoon to all of you. Welcome back.

Thanks for adjusting to the new courtroom. I thought a larger courtroom would allow everybody to socially distance, as prudent, given the alarming rise in the new variant around us.

A reminder. We are in an unclassified setting, so please restrict yourself and ensure that you don't say anything revealing classified information. A heads-up, going forward, you should let me know in advance of a conference if you anticipate that there would be a discussion or need to be a discussion of anything classified that would allow us to make the necessary arrangements both for a court reporter who is cleared and also a courtroom in which we can have such discussions. So just a reminder about that, but for today's purposes, please make sure that you restrict your comments.

Mr. Schulte's preconference letter at ECF-644 requested an audio call-in line for his family to listen. I'm

certainly sympathetic to that request, but I'm constrained to deny it. Under Rule 53, the Court is not permitted to allow live broadcasting from the courtroom. Courts were authorized to basically provide for an exception to that when access to the courthouse was limited during Covid, but we've been advised that that is no longer the case, and so the rule must be complied with, and therefore, I can't provide for live broadcasting.

There have been a lot of fillings, suffice it to say, and I plan to cover a lot of ground today, so I'm going to start with some case management-related matters, then turn to conditions of confinement issues and then the substantive motions. We'll take breaks as needed, and certainly if the court reporter needs me to take a break for her sake, I will certainly do so.

I will make one request, and this is more directed to you, Mr. Schulte, than anyone else. I don't begrudge you filing things. You obviously should file whatever you think is appropriate, but there's a lot of repetition in your filings. For instance, some of the things related to discovery issues or conditions of confinement are not just repeated but often repeated verbatim from one filing to another. I assure you I will read everything you file. I will deal with everything you file. You don't need to repeat it. You can incorporate it by reference. You can make reference to a prior filing, but it's

burdensome enough without doing that to make me read things two, three, four times. It will simply make my job more difficult and make it more difficult for me to give you rulings in a timely fashion, so I would ask you to try and refrain from doing that and be as concise as you can.

One preliminary matter.

Mr. Denton, unless you tell me that Judge Crotty complied with the Due Process Protections Act previously, I didn't see anything on the docket that reflected that, I thought I should just address that.

MR. DENTON: Yes, your Honor.

We saw the Court's order today. I've reviewed it.

I'm sure Mr. Lockard has as well. He's not here today.

THE COURT: All right.

The Due Process Protections Act was an act passed last year that requires me to remind the prosecution of its obligations, under Brady v. Maryland and its progeny, to disclose to the defense all information, whether admissible or not, that is favorable to the defendant, material either to guilt or to punishment and known to the prosecution. The prosecution must make good faith efforts to disclose such information to the defense as soon as reasonably possible. Failure to do so may result in any number of consequences, including a continuance, sanctions, dismissal, or vacatur of a conviction.

As Mr. Denton just noted, I've entered a written order in compliance with the law, which is codified at Rule 5(f), and that describes more fully the government's obligations and the possible consequences of violating it. So, Mr. Denton, thank you for confirming that you've read it. Please ensure that Mr. Lockard does as well. We will be discussing some related issues today, but I trust that you will comply with the obligations and have done so to date.

With that, let's get started. Again, we'll start with case management issues.

Mr. Schulte filed a motion for quote/unquote missing discovery, and the government has responded to that. Based on the government's response, I'm persuaded that most of the issues raised by Mr. Schulte in his letter are without merit and don't require further discussion. In particular, the issues relating to Google emails, the Verizon subpoenas and returns, discovery indexes and the AFD reports and analyses.

There are a couple of things as to which the government said it would follow up. One is lost drives with forensic productions 6, 9 and 12. Second is the extracted copy of the so-called root volume.

Mr. Denton, as to those, I would be inclined to have you provide an update to me and obviously Mr. Schulte as well within a couple weeks.

Does that seem reasonable?

MR. DENTON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you do that, let's say, by January 5.

Mr. Schulte, anything you wish to say about any of those items?

THE DEFENDANT: I guess I never received anything from the government in response to the Verizon, Google or any of those issues yet, so I don't know what the -- if I should just wait and then review those and then respond to the Court, or --

THE COURT: Meaning, you haven't gotten the government's response, which is ECF No. 647, is that correct?

THE DEFENDANT: That's correct. I haven't been receiving government responses. It takes, like, two to three weeks.

THE COURT: All right. That's one of the items on my agenda.

You'll get it in due course, but quick summary, apparently with respect to the Google search warrant returns, some of them were provided in unclassified discovery and some was in classified discovery, and that may explain why you haven't located all of it; there are no further records with respect to Verizon to be produced; and the other items that are also addressed here, the government takes the position that it has no obligation to provide you with an index, but it is going to do so anyway; it is exploring the matter of the root volume

with the FBI and also looking into the three missing drives at the MDC, and those are the two issues that I want the government to provide an update on no later than January 5; and reiterates that the items that you have raised several times with respect to purported discovery, as a matter of fact, *Brady* material — namely, the AFD reports or analyses — no such documents exist.

I accept that representation. Obviously, if it turns out to be otherwise, then the government will have some answering to do, but I have no reason to question that representation. Again, I assume you'll get that in due course.

Mr. Denton.

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, if I may, could we ask until January 7 to provide that update? I think with the holidays and everything it may help to have the benefit of that week. If there is an opportunity to provide a response sooner, we certainly will.

THE COURT: Sure. I'll give you until the 7th.

One related matter, in Mr. Schulte's preconference letter at ECF-644, he requests an updated version of the electronic version of the docket basically on a month-by-month basis. Mr. Denton, that seems reasonable enough, since presumably it's the most recent things that are most relevant. Any objection to making provision to do that?

MR. DENTON: So, your Honor, I'm not entirely sure.

When we did this the last time, we had to work with Judge Crotty's deputy and the clerk's office because there's not a batch way to download an entire electronic docket. To the extent that what the defendant wants is just PDF copies of things, we can certainly do that relatively easily, but there was just a little bit of a delta with how we did it the last time that made it a little more complicated.

THE COURT: All right. You guys are regularly communicating about case management-type things, is that correct?

MR. DENTON: We have been, your Honor, and we have another call scheduled for next week, so we should be able to work that out.

THE COURT: Great. Why don't you put that on the agenda as long as -- I think Mr. Schulte is certainly entitled to have in some usable fashion what has been filed in the case, and whether that is -- I'm not sure I care what form it takes, but I think if his desires on that front can be accommodated, then we should try to do that. OK?

Mr. Schulte.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. I just wanted to respond to that there is no more communications between the parties due to the government's insistence on recording and using --

THE COURT: I'm going to get to that in short order.

THE DEFENDANT: OK.

THE COURT: All right. Also on discovery, one quick word on the government's letter regarding the search warrant — that is, the March 2017 search warrant, ECF No. 625 — Mr. Denton, suffice it to say I'm not happy about the apparent failure to produce that document and others earlier, but I fail to see that any prejudice resulted given that that search was not executed, meaning the search was not executed in response to that warrant and so, too, with respect to the other documents.

That being said, I don't know if you have any update. You said that you expected to have an update within a week or two. I think it's been more than a week or two, so any update on that front?

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, we are planning, consistent with the Court's order, to provide an update in writing later this week. The bottom line is that we believe that everything is there, that we have complied with providing the returns that are there. Again, these are warrants for which there were not returns to be produced, but we are mindful of the Court's concern and of our obligations and are reviewing carefully to make sure that nothing was missed. That's a little bit complex in this case because of the technical nature of some of the data, so making an accurate comparison with what's in the file with what was produced in discovery takes a little more work than just looking at a few things side by side. We're

optimistic to be able to provide a positive report to the Court as scheduled.

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

With respect to mailing delays and filing issues,

Mr. Schulte has mentioned in a couple of filings I just

mentioned a moment ago that there are significant delays in his

receipt of orders and government filings, and I gather that is

since the MDC has stopped delivering the mail, and he requests

that I order the government to revert to that practice and

ensure delivery within one to two days.

Mr. Denton, I don't know if you have any thoughts on this front, but I do think that ensuring timely delivery of things to Mr. Schulte is really essential to keeping this case on track and proceeding in an orderly fashion.

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, we certainly understand that.

As far as what the U.S. Attorney's Office has been doing, whenever there is a government filing or a court order, we have ensured that it is mailed to Mr. Schulte either the same day or no later than the following day. I gather that there is a bit of a discrepancy between what Mr. Schulte is reporting about how frequently mail is either delivered to him or picked up from him and what the Bureau of Prisons mail logs and records show. It certainly does take him time to receive orders and filings through the U.S. mail. There's no question about that. It has to be transported, delivered, inspected,

etc., but I'm not sure that there is a more efficient way to go about it, given that it is, in some respects, equally problematic to be ordering BOP legal personnel to make personal deliveries for him and not for other defendant. So this is the solution that had been come to.

THE COURT: I'm not sure I understand what the solution you're referring to is.

MR. DENTON: Well, your Honor, I think it is that both the government and standby counsel assumed responsibility for delivery within their power. In the government's case, that is to mail it to him. We have talked extensively with the Bureau of Prisons about making sure things are marked appropriately so that they are delivered as legal mail as quickly as possible. Again, I'm not entirely sure from the government's side what more there is that we can do here.

THE COURT: Can I ask you a question first, and then I'll hear from standby counsel and Mr. Schulte.

Given that Mr. Schulte is coming to the SCIF on a regular basis, is there not a means by which to essentially ensure that he receives whatever has been filed in the prior few days or prior week when he's here? In other words, that should seemingly ensure that he receives things no later than seven days and presumably less than the period of seven days after they've been filed. Is that not an option?

MR. DENTON: That's certainly an option, your Honor.

I think to the extent that's an option the Court would pursue, the appropriate course would be for standby counsel to print those things and provide them to him. We can't mail things to the courthouse SCIF, so that would otherwise require us to make a weekly delivery from the government. I'm not sure that that's any more efficient than simply having standby counsel perform that task.

THE COURT: OK.

Ms. Shroff or Ms. Colson, I don't know if you have any thoughts or suggestions here.

MS. SHROFF: Your Honor, may I?

THE COURT: Can you put the microphone closer.

MS. SHROFF: Sure.

Your Honor, as far as Ms. Colson and I are concerned, when Mr. Schulte is produced in the SCIF, he is given an updated printout of the ECF and the documents that are attached.

I just want to take a minute and note for the Court that the MDC getting mail from the United States Attorney's Office is a wholly different thing than the MDC getting mail from either Ms. Colson or my office. I think it's far more expeditiously received and processed when it is coming from the United States, so I think there is a real difference between who the sender is and how quickly that mail is processed.

Also, I don't think Mr. Denton needs to be concerned

about there being a caveat or a different way that Mr. Schulte is getting his mail as opposed to everybody else in the MDC's getting mail. Mr. Schulte is not like everybody else in the MDC. He is representing himself pro se, so the same rules should not apply to him that apply to all of the other people who are not going pro se.

Now, of course, at that time people going pro se at the MDC, all ten of them, should be treated the same way Mr. Schulte's being treated because, after all, he is the lawyer, and we are in a really big bind here, your Honor, because Mr. Schulte's quite adamant that we are merely standby. And according to Mr. Schulte, the definition of standby is that we stand by until he directs otherwise.

So to the extent we're able to send him mail, and we do every single time a memorandum or an order is issued or a filing is done, he gets the mail. We give him the mail both by snail mail, where we mail it, and we give it to him in the SCIF. That is what we have been doing.

Of course, if the government is willing, they can certainly print out their filings and leave them for us, let us know, or even leave them outside the SCIF, because they are certainly not classified or anything other than on the docket. That's all I can tell you about the mailing. We do it, as you have ordered us, within 24 hours of something hitting the docket.

THE COURT: OK. But what about my suggestion of just ensuring that he receives whatever was filed in the prior X days each time he comes to the SCIF; wouldn't that be a backstop and ensure that he gets thing in a timely fashion?

MS. SHROFF: We absolutely do it every single time. Every single time there is a filing, unless it's he who has done the filing, we give it to him. We also give him an updated docket. If he came to the SCIF, for example, on December 1 and the next time he comes is on December 7, then we give him the printout of the docket from December 1 to December 7. If one of us is not there in the SCIF -- so if Ms. Colson and I are not the people on SCIF duty, so to speak -- we let him know what has been filed, and we ensure that the filing is delivered to him by whoever's at the SCIF.

THE COURT: OK. But how do I reconcile that with his claim that he sometimes doesn't get things for a couple weeks? That doesn't seem reconcilable.

(Counsel and defendant conferred)

MS. SHROFF: So, Mr. Schulte, I think -- I don't think this is correct, but I think that it's possible that there are days that the person who is at the SCIF is not somebody that is with either my office or Ms. Colson's office; he's simply a cleared person, and he doesn't have any access, as we have repeatedly told the government, to an office, ability to scan, ability to email. But there might be an off chance where that

person is doing SCIF duty, so to speak, and there is a lag of some sort. But as far as I know, that is not a frequent occurrence, because one of us tries to come down and give the paperwork and then go back and leave.

THE COURT: And you're representing that you print out both the docket record of what has been filed since the last SCIF session as well as a copy of any order or filing other than Mr. Schulte's own filings. Is that correct?

MS. SHROFF: Yes. But may I just confirm with Ms. Colson?

THE COURT: Yes.

MS. SHROFF: Your Honor, thank you.

I did confirm with Ms. Colson, and that is correct, the date hypothetical I gave you. If the last time I printed out the docket for him was December 10, then I would print out the docket from December 10 until today, which is December 20.

THE COURT: Just the docket or also the documents?

MS. SHROFF: No, no. The docket and the documents. Both certainly, your Honor. And also, Ms. Colson and I think that, we also print out -- we have parrot records. So if he has filings in the Court of Appeals, we print out the actual docket and the document. But there may be a time, like what happened, I think, a week ago, when Mr. Schulte wasn't brought to the SCIF because of the problems with, I think it was the Maxwell trial, or for whatever reason, there could be a time

where there is a filing on a Tuesday, but he's not brought to the SCIF until the following week, the Tuesday, in which case he would have more than a week where he gets nothing.

THE COURT: OK. But it seems to me that if you both are complying with the direction to mail things within 24 hours and he's being provided with copies each time that he comes to the SCIF, that more or less ensures that he will get things within a couple of days of them being filed in every instance.

Am I missing something?

MS. SHROFF: I don't think -- I'm not sure whether the Court is missing something or there is a disconnect. But I do say this to the Court. There seems to be a significant delay with MDC giving mail to those people in the SHU. To the extent that he's coming to the SCIF, we update him and I again have confirmed with Ms. Colson that we print out and we give him whatever filing has been made. But if there's a filing, for example, that hits the docket at 4:45 and he's been in the SCIF on that Tuesday and he's gone, then he doesn't get that until the next time he shows up in the SCIF, which could be a week from that Tuesday.

That is why I think it would be very helpful if the government had some kind of mechanism by which the MDC actually processes the mail that the government sends him. There is a distinction between their mailing address and our mailing address, and I'm sure the Court knows that.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Denton, I'm going to ask you to look a little bit into this and to include it in the January 7 letter, and by this I mean I certainly agree with you that Mr. Schulte shouldn't get any special treatment, but I think Ms. Shroff is not wrong in saying that a defendant who is representing himself or herself has a different need to receive things in a timely fashion than another inmate, because the fact of the matter is it's not just his interest, it's also my interest in ensuring that this case proceeds in a timely and efficient manner, and if he's not receiving things in a timely and efficient matter, it makes it very difficult for the case to proceed in that way.

What I would ask is for you check with MDC legal and figure out if there is an efficient means to deliver things more quickly to defendants who represent themselves and for you to report back to me about that, and in connection with that report, I'd actually like a number of how many defendants are similarly situated in the MDC, how many are representing themselves for whom this would be an issue, so I have a sense of what the burden would be on the MDC. All right?

MR. DENTON: We understand, your Honor.

I will say we have communicated about this extensively with the MDC and we have conveyed the Court's concerns about it and noted this particular concern about the defendant's pro se

status. To Ms. Shroff's point, we have been marking mail as legal mail from the U.S. Attorney's Office to try and expedite that. We'll see what else we can do.

THE COURT: OK. And you should tell them that if they want to avoid a more burdensome order, they may want to come up with a practical solution themselves.

Yes, Ms. Shroff.

MS. SHROFF: Your Honor, I believe I could be wrong, because I don't remember if this was fully out there, but as I understood it, I think Judge Crotty kind of tried to help us all out and said that perhaps MDC legal would just receive the filings via email, print it out and give it to Mr. Schulte.

Ms. Colson reminds me of that, but I think that's what Judge Crotty may have ordered, but I'm not really sure whether MDC would agree with it or not, but that's another solution.

THE COURT: Sure.

MS. SHROFF: I finally want to note one thing.

I'm not able to give Mr. Schulte something. Right? So I go to the SHU. I can sit down and talk to Mr. Schulte, but even if I represent to them -- and I've tried this with another client; I think that client was before you,

Mr. Mercado -- I'm not able to hand up any legal paperwork to somebody who's in the SHU, no matter -- even if it's just the docket. So the best I can do is go to the SHU, tell him there's a 40-page filing, and then come back downstairs and

just throw it in the legal mailbox. I'm not able to hand-deliver; I just wanted you to know that. If that were an option, I suppose we would undertake it.

THE COURT: Is that true in the SCIF as well? Can he receive something in the SCIF and then take it back to the MDC?

MS. SHROFF: He can take it back to the MDC only if

MS. SHROFF: He can take it back to the MDC only if it's unclassified.

THE COURT: Obviously.

MS. SHROFF: Well, I know. I'm just trying to answer you completely. If it's just a filing, then he can take it back, yes.

THE COURT: OK. So, again, it doesn't seem like this should be a problem, and I'm not quite sure I understand why it is a problem, given the various backstops that we have. That being said, I do want Mr. Denton to discuss it with MDC and try and figure out if there is a more efficient means of delivering it to him than the current system. So I'll expect to hear back from the government on that.

Mr. Schulte, anything you wish to say?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. There's been a bunch said.

For the first thing, so about the standby counsel and delivering things to the SCIF, so, for example, last week, I didn't get anything, so the last thing I got from them was December 8, and that's because the specific person who was there that last week was not able to bring me things. And so

that's the biggest issue. So whenever that happens, it could be several weeks before I get something from them, and they've been basically providing things to me as a nice to-do, but it hasn't been, as far as they are concerned, it's not an order from the Court, so I've been primarily relying upon the government. And the government says that the mail delays aren't like I claim them to be because of some logbook. I haven't seen that, but I do have here — envelope that was marked November 15. It was received by MDC November 23, and it was delivered to me November 29. And this is the quickest I've gotten things, so that's 14 days there. That's just on the envelope. It's clearly signed by the person.

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Schulte, Mr. Denton is going to look into it. I think if we can come up with a more efficient delivery system to the MDC, we should. And I recognize there will be occasions where things don't work in a well-oiled manner, but it sounds like, with various backstops, we have a system in place that should ensure you get things in a timely fashion, and we'll go from there.

Anything else on this?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. I think that's -- I guess I just wanted to -- they mentioned something about Judge Crotty's orders before, so I just wanted to clarify that, that in Dkt.

515, Judge Crotty denied my motion to compel the MDC to deliver mail promptly, and it was on the condition that the government

followed the old procedures, that it delivers -- it mails stuff to the MDC, then they give it to me within one to two days.

That was Judge Crotty's ruling from Dkt. 515.

THE COURT: All right. Thanks for alerting me to that.

The next item has to do with Mr. Schulte's request to file things via CD, which I guess he would deliver to the MDC. I'm not quite sure how it would work, but Mr. Denton, anything you wish to say on that front? As far as I can tell, Mr. Schulte's not having any problem filing things, since he seems to file things on a nearly-daily basis, but be that as it may, what's your thought.

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, we share that impression.

I'm not entirely sure what the plan would be for a CD after it gets delivered to the MDC whether it would be mailed to the Court or whatnot. But I will say, I think, fundamentally we do not have an issue with however the Court prefers to receive filings from the defendant.

THE COURT: Mr. Schulte, do you want to explain exactly what you're proposing?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, and just to be 100 percent clear on this, most of the times I can have standby counsel file things when I move to the SCIF, and the biggest problem here is when the Court has deadlines, so if the deadline's on a Thursday, but I don't -- I only have a SCIF day on Monday,

Tuesday, there's no way -- unless I file it early, there's no way to specifically meet the court deadline. And so the DVD/CD filling was basically proposed simply to go the opposite way of the way the government had been delivering things to me. It's simply I have the DVDs, blank DVDs that I simply put the PDF on to be filed. I give it to MDC, one of the corrections officers. They simply give it to unit, unit team there, and then legal either mails it, sends it by email and just attaches an email to send it to either standby counsel or the government, or whoever, and then it gets ECF-filed from there. That way, I can meet court deadlines on specific dates, and things like that.

THE COURT: All right. Gotcha. OK. I am not going to go that route. That seems like a recipe for disaster and creating more problems than solutions.

I think, instead, what would make sense is if you know what days you have things due — first of all, my hope is that there will be fewer deadlines going forward in the sense that there will be fewer filings going forward. But be that as it may, if you think that there's a disjuncture between the days you'll be in the SCIF and a deadline for filing is a couple days after you'll be in the SCIF, if you want to file a letter just requesting permission to file two days later, when you anticipate you'll be in the SCIF, I'm certainly happy to make that accommodation for you to make things easier. That seems

like an easier system than the one that you're proposing.

Next on my list is handling of filings by standby counsel. I really don't quite understand. This is an issue that the government raised in its preconference letter. I also think that there have been issues over time with respect to filings that may contain classified information. I'm going to be deliberately vague on that front. Honestly, I do not understand why I need to be involved in this. This seems like something that counsel should be able to deal with professionally and in good faith.

I have reviewed Judge Crotty's September 23 order at ECF No. 518, and it seems pretty clear to me what standby counsels' responsibilities are with respect to filings, and also it's very clear to me that that order does not apply to filings that may contain classified information which are governed by the protective order, which, at present, is at ECF No. 61, though there may be one that supersedes that order in due course, all of which is to say I don't quite understand what the issue is. It seems like the duties and responsibilities of standby counsel are pretty clear and don't require any clarification.

But, Ms. Shroff or Ms. Colson, is there something I'm missing here? Is there some reason that I need to even be discussing this?

MS. SHROFF: Well, your Honor, I don't know. We went

through an entire trial and managed to survive it, and I'm not sure exactly what has changed. Judge Crotty's order gives us the option of informing the government that they have mail and they should pick it up, and that is what we do. And that is largely because, and I reiterate again, that there are SCIF days during which neither Ms. Colson nor I are physically here. We simply have a cleared paralegal, who is required to stay alongside Mr. Schulte. So when Mr. Schulte informs him that there is a missive or a letter or a filing, they call the U.S. Attorney's Office and leave a message, and the U.S. Attorney's Office, who has quite, I would say triple, at least, the number of employees that Mr. Schulte has, we ask them to come pick it up. I don't see the issue, honestly.

THE COURT: If you look at Dkt. No. 518, it provides for correspondence to be scanned and emailed, to be delivered to the U.S. Attorney's Office space on the fifth floor as long as staff is present to accept it and the government is to arrange for staff to be present during the regularly scheduled SCIF hours, and if staff is not present, then the burden shifts on to the government, upon notice from standby counsel, to promptly collect it. So if what you're suggesting to me is that you're relying on that, that is only if the first three options are not readily available.

MS. SHROFF: Right, and the first option is that we call and let them know that they have a letter and they can

come pick it up. That's what Judge Crotty ordered.

The reason we asked for that to be included, your Honor, is because lawyers are not -- we are not there at the SCIF. He's at the SCIF for, like, hours at a time. Neither Ms. Colson nor I are there. We had to advertise for somebody to come fill that slot. We barely managed to find one person who was willing to do it, and that is why we asked specifically Judge Crotty to shift the burden, so to speak, on to the government, and that is one of the options that the judge gives us. And frankly, we're kind of worried about this scanning and emailing. It's really worked to our detriment.

We are not classification experts. When they first asked us to undertake that responsibility, we contacted the CISO and expressed our deep concern that we do not have -- we simply do not have -- the correct level of knowledge to decide these issues, and we would rather do what we have always done in this case, which was give the filings to the U.S. Attorney's Office, who had different lawyers at that time and managed to help us out so that there wasn't a mishap or a spill or a wrong filing, and that prophylactic was extremely helpful.

We would prefer very much to stick to that process because I think it reduces error, because nothing is hitting the docket, and we've discussed this several times with the CISO who is present in court today.

THE COURT: All right. As a general matter, my

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understanding, I recognize that you're not a classification expert and you're certainly not a classification authority, but it seems to me that filings can certainly be divided, at a minimum, into two buckets, one that make reference to things that Mr. Schulte may or may not have learned from his employment at the CIA, which I would think you should operate with the presumption that they may contain classified information, versus things that don't relate to that at all, relate to his conditions of confinement, relate to filing issues, relate to those sorts of things, which clearly do not, presumably, involve any classified information. I would think that it makes sense to err on the side of caution and submit the former -- anything that references information that he may have gained from his time at the CIA or information that may or may not be on the WikiLeaks leaks -- and submit those in a fashion that ensures that they're reviewed.

But beyond that, Mr. Denton, again, I find it a little ridiculous that I need to involve myself in this, and I would think that counsel should be able to figure this out in a way that makes sense for everybody, recognizing that you have day jobs and they involve things that are more weighty than delivering mail, but be that as it may, what are your thoughts on this?

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, I generally tend to agree with you in that the order from the court, from Judge Crotty,

previously was quite clear about sort of what the sequence of options was.

We have generally been able to retrieve mail from the SCIF when Ms. Shroff has asked. That's not something that we've always been able to do. Part of the problem is not the actual sort of transmission of mail but communication about it. So, for example, the defendant, in one of his filings, claimed that he had sent a letter to the government regarding the proposed protective order changes. We never got that. It was not in any of the sort of batches of mail that were picked up from the SCIF. We asked defense counsel, Is there a letter we need to pick up? And the response that we got from standby counsel was, You should call the MDC and talk to the lawyer on the case, Mr. Schulte.

I think in dealing with each other professionally here, it's entirely appropriate for us to just work out basic questions and for standby counsel to help perform some of these functions. If there are paralegals who can't do, I understand, but we've got to work around that somehow.

MS. SHROFF: Your Honor, that's really — to further involve the Court in something, and I just ask you to indulge us here for a minute, that's not really what happened. The government asked us about a specific filing. I cannot stress this enough. Mr. Schulte insists that we remain standby unless he says otherwise.

not actually up to Mr. Schulte. This order, among others, specifies what your duties and responsibilities are as standby counsel. The law specifies your duties and responsibilities as standby counsel, and I hate to break it to Mr. Schulte, but those duties and responsibilities are more substantial than he may think. All right? And we'll get to this in some of the issues that we have to discuss today. But the fact of the matter is some of the things that Mr. Schulte would like he doesn't get because he has standby counsel who are available to him to perform certain functions that are more substantial than he may want you to perform. So he's going to have to make some choices going forward, but making you potted plants is not among the choices that he has.

MS. SHROFF: I appreciate the Court letting him know that.

As to that particular letter the government describes, we informed the government we didn't know. Mr. Schulte was brought to the SCIF the next day. By 10:00 that morning, we had contacted Mr. Schulte. Both of us were unavailable to physically be in the SCIF, but we immediately contacted Mr. Schulte. We told him there was a letter that the government wanted that they didn't have and that he should contact the government. We asked the paralegal to place a call to Mr. Lockard, and I believe I literally told Mr. Schulte,

Hang up on me now, call the government, answer their question, and then I will call you back at 1:00. And that's exactly what we did. That was the very next day after the government informed us of this missing letter of which neither Ms. Colson nor I had any information substantively.

So we did exactly what we were told to do. We communicated that to the man who had the answer and told him to call Mr. Lockard. Really, there isn't any reason for the Court to be involved. The procedures worked well before. The problem right now is that the government and Mr. Schulte do not want to speak to each other, and that's where there is a gap, and they, unfortunately, have to speak to each other, because they're opposing counsel.

THE COURT: All right. And we will get to that, but can I ask standby counsel and counsel for the government, let's try to do this better. I don't understand why you can't manage without court intervention to deal with just exchanging documents in an orderly fashion that minimizes the burdens on everybody. It just seems like that is something that you should be able to accomplish. It seems like it worked for a long time in this case, and I don't know why it has broken down recently, but this seems like something that everybody should be able to get past and do better. OK?

I don't have a better solution than that. It doesn't seem to me that the answer is to prescribe an ever more

detailed procedure in an order that governs who does what and when. They're fairly specific. They're fairly clear. It seems like it's much more a function of everybody presuming good faith and trying to do right by the other side than it is about any orders that I can enter. OK?

Mr. Denton.

MR. DENTON: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: Ms. Shroff.

MS. SHROFF: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: In terms of filing of classified information or not, again, the orders on that are very clear. I reread the protective order that's currently in place. It's very clear. If standby counsel or Mr. Schulte have reason to believe that something contains classified information, they have certain obligations with respect to the handling of that and need to take care that it not get publicly docketed. By the same token, I would expect the government, if there is a problem, to bring it to my attention promptly and not to wait six, seven, eight days after something has been filed to alert me, let alone on a Friday evening, that there's a problem.

So again, I'm not sure if there's -- it doesn't strike me that there's a need for clearer or more specific orders. I think everybody just needs to try harder to comply with the orders that exist and do better. And again, to me, it seems like dividing the filings into buckets -- those that pertain to

Mr. Schulte's knowledge as a CIA employee versus things that don't relate to that at all and erring on the side of caution with respect to the first bucket -- seems like a prudent way to approach it.

Any questions about that?

Mr. Denton.

MR. DENTON: No, your Honor. We understand.

THE COURT: Ms. Shroff.

MS. SHROFF: No, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right.

Mr. Hartenstine, do you have anything you want to add on that?

MR. HARTENSTINE: Thanks for asking, your Honor, but no.

THE COURT: All right. Let me also say what I said to Mr. Hartenstine earlier. I think part of the problem, and this goes back to what I said earlier about my hope that there will be fewer filings going forward, I think it would make sense for Mr. Hartenstine or one of his colleagues to be available on days where we can anticipate and do anticipate that Mr. Schulte will have substantive filings going forward, and my hope is that that will be clear from the schedule that we set today, and in that regard some of these issues will be less problematic if there's somebody here and available on those days when we anticipate substantive filings being made. But

again, at the end of the day, I think it's as much everybody just trying to handle these things in good faith.

All right. Next on my list of case management things is Mr. Schulte has raised, in several filings -- ECF Nos. 582, 591, and 605 -- an issue with respect to the forensic image of what he refers to or parties refer to as SC01. If I understand correctly, I think the gravamen of his complaint is that he's required to review the forensic image in the presence of an FBI agent and that he considers that to be unfair or an infringement on his right to prepare a defense.

Mr. Schulte, is that correct? Is there anything else you wish to say on that front?

THE DEFENDANT: Well, I think the primary issue Judge Crotty already ruled on, and there's an interlocutory appeal about this.

The issue that I raised here is a different issue. It's, in the forensic discovery that I received from the government, they gave me two — there are two hard drives. One of them they allege has CP on it and the other one was encrypted that I cannot even access, and they don't allege it has classified information or CP, and so I'm trying to figure out what that drive is or why that's even not been produced to me in unclassified discovery outside of the SCIF, if it doesn't have any of those materials. So that's what my request was specifically in my December 16 letter.

THE COURT: Again, maybe I'm missing something, but I think you had made a request with respect to the form of the items, and Judge Crotty rejected that and I'm not going to revisit that ruling. I thought that the gravamen of your current, remaining complaint had to do with whether you could review these materials in the presence of an FBI agent or not.

THE DEFENDANT: No. That's -- no, no. That's been resolved already. So the FBI, what they do is they take the drives out.

THE COURT: Let me stop you. Is there any remaining issue to be resolved?

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah, the issue isn't — it's not a recurring issue. It's the fact that there is a second drive that's been produced that's part of the CP drives, but the government hasn't, isn't alleging there's any CP on it, so I'm trying to figure out what the second drive is, why it's included with the CP drives if there's no CP on it, and it's encrypted too, so I can't access the data. So there's basically two requests. One is for the government to decrypt it and give it to me in a decrypted format, and two, to either identify to me where the alleged CP material is, or if there's not anything, to explain why it's in restricted format.

THE COURT: All right.

THE DEFENDANT: Does that make sense?

THE COURT: Mr. Denton.

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, I'm honestly a bit confused.

There were two discovery drives that were provided to the defendant that were recopied. One contains the SC01 server, which has the child pornography on it, which is covered by the Adam Walsh Act provisions, which I understand does contain an encrypted partition that was encrypted by the defendant. There is a separate hard drive, which is the server 02 hard drive, which does contain classified information. That does not have to be handled consistent with the Adam Walsh Act restrictions, and to the extent it is, we can clarify with the FBI or otherwise that it does not need to be.

THE COURT: Great.

MR. DENTON: Beyond that, I'm not sure what else there is to do.

THE COURT: Great. Why don't you clarify that with the FBI, and hopefully, that will resolve the issue.

All right, Mr. Schulte?

THE DEFENDANT: I think the confusion is that the SC1 drive actually is including two -- it includes two separate drives, so I don't know how we can work this out. But SC1 drive is actually two drives. There's SC1-1 and SC1 re 5. Those are two different, completely different hard drives that have completely different sets of data.

THE COURT: All right. Look --

THE DEFENDANT: I guess we just need to work it out.

THE COURT: -- why don't you discuss that with Mr. Denton in your next call, but it seems like something that you should be able to sort out on your own.

Next item is SCIF time.

Mr. Schulte's preconference letter -- again,

ECF-644 -- complains about the late arrivals to and from the

SCIF on certain days. I certainly understand the frustration,
but those seem like more isolated problems than systemic ones,
and so I don't think there's any cause for me to intervene and
deal with it. Otherwise, I haven't heard any complaints, so I

assume that the system of increase in SCIF time is working.

But I was advised by the marshals that Mr. Schulte is not even
using all of his time and on a regular basis asks to leave the

SCIF early, which is certainly fine by me, but will make it a

little bit hard to complain at a later time about insufficient
time in the SCIF. So again, given that I haven't heard larger
complaints, I'm hoping and assuming that that is not an issue
that we need to spend more time on.

THE DEFENDANT: So --

THE COURT: Yes, ms. Shroff.

MS. SHROFF: Your Honor, I just wanted to take a minute and say that I am eternally grateful to the United States Marshals Service for working with us, especially Gary, whose last name I do not know. They actually do take the time to even email us and tell us at times when Mr. Schulte is going

to be brought literally hours late. It sometimes helps. It sometimes doesn't. But I do raise this one point, and I also raise this on behalf of the marshals service itself.

I am informed that when Mr. Schulte is taken back, because he is a SAMs inmate, he and the marshal are made to sit in their car for hours at a time before Mr. Schulte is processed back into the MDC. So we tried to help out both -- and I want to be clear, both -- the marshals and Mr. Schulte so they didn't spend hours in their car sitting there, that maybe if Mr. Schulte went back a little bit earlier, then he could slide in before the regular detainees are taken back to the jail.

Sometimes Mr. Schulte just wants to go back earlier, but sometimes we do say it's better for him to go back faster so that they don't all sit in their car, and I think that I've encouraged the marshals service to speak to you about this so that they don't expend the time sitting in the car just waiting there with Mr. Schulte. I just wanted to flag that for you because I think they might approach you at some point.

THE COURT: Because what?

MS. SHROFF: Because I think the marshals may approach you with that problem at some point.

THE COURT: OK.

MS. SHROFF: OK.

THE COURT: Thank you.

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Mr. Schulte.

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. So two, two issues on that, for the arrival and the departure. So yeah, the marshal to my right, he was there one evening where we waited five and a half hours, but essentially, according to MDC, since I'm SAMs, we always have to go back to the end of the line. So even though we arrive at MDC first, we end up waiting six hours because new cars, as they come in, they keep passing us because they say I have to go last. So that is consistent, and that is the reason why I try to leave a couple hours early, at two, simply so —to hope to try and avoid that issue.

So on the arrival issue, the Court's order was very helpful, and it was working great, but the last three weeks have been consistent in that MDC, due to this new trial, hasn't produced me to the marshals until 11. So the marshals show up at 7 a.m. and tell me --

THE COURT: All right. Mr. Schulte, that trial has summations going on today, so it's not going to be lasting much longer. That's a temporary problem.

THE DEFENDANT: Oh, so we think that's going to be resolved? OK.

THE COURT: I'll talk to the marshals about the return issue, since it sounds like that has some compounding effects, but I obviously don't know if that's something that I can fix or not. But I'll certainly raise it with them and see what can

be done.

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The next item I said we'd talk about earlier is the recording of phone calls. The defendant's request for an order directing the government to stop recording calls with him is denied. The government provides good reasons for recording the In fact, it seems to me that it's in the defendant's calls. interests for there to be a record of such communications, and his argument that recording the calls violates his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights is without merit, indeed probably frivolous. Whether or to what extent the government may use those recordings at trial is an entirely separate matter that is not ripe for me to decide today and may never become an issue, particularly if Mr. Schulte is as careful as he should be in those communications. But this is a problem and complication that is inherent in representing oneself in a criminal case and one of the many reasons that most judges would tell defendants not to go down that path.

I also want to be clear, Mr. Schulte, you do not have the option to refuse to speak to the government. So Ms. Shroff mentioned earlier or you mentioned earlier that those communications were not going to be occurring. That is not an option. There are prior orders of the court and Judge Crotty that require that communication. It is absolutely necessary for the orderly and efficient management of this case, and there is no alternative given that you are representing

yourself. You are acting as your own lawyer. It is necessary for you to converse with the government about the sorts of issues that we're discussing today and many other issues. And that is particularly true given your objections — objections that are without basis, by the way — to more than minimal involvement on the part of standby counsel.

The bottom line is that this case cannot proceed without orderly and regular communications between you and the government, and if you refuse to communicate with the government, notwithstanding the fact that they may record those calls, you risk forfeiture or revocation of your *pro se* status. I don't know how to put it any more bluntly than that.

Any questions about that, Mr. Schulte?
(Defendant and counsel conferred)

THE COURT: Forgive me, but we have a lot of ground to cover today.

THE DEFENDANT: Is there any way that we could just revert to letters and assuring that the government is delivering the letter within a day and I am in the SCIF and I can send a letter within a day of the SCIF instead of doing the phone calls.

THE COURT: No.

THE DEFENDANT: Because I want to do this quicker.

THE COURT: No. It think it is clear to me that the issues that we're discussing are issues that require

communication. Doing it by letter is inefficient and not likely to resolve many of these issues. It requires more efficient communication than that. I'm happy to say the telephone calls should, in general, be restricted to logistical, nonsubstantive issues. I think that makes sense, but I think that those conversations have to occur. So if they're limited to logistical, nonsubstantive issues, then I can't imagine that any recording would ever be used against you, and as I said, I think it's in everybody's interests that there is a record of those communications. So the bottom line is no. All right?

Let's move on.

The next item on my list is the modifications to the protective order. I got a letter proposing some relatively minor modifications from the government on Friday. It did not appear to be a joint submission, so I don't know what that means about standby counsels' views or Mr. Schulte's views. I would also note that I had contemplated, and I apologize if my order wasn't clear on this point, was that it would pay to have a single supplemental — not supplemental, really a superseding protective order that supersedes all the existing protective orders, so there's a single order and things are clear and updated and so forth.

The government's letter makes reference to a supplemental protective order at ECF-75, but that's not

incorporated into the proposal, so at a minimum, I'd be inclined to send it back, if you will, and have you guys take another stab at it. But I also want to know what Mr. Schulte's and standby counsels' thoughts are.

Mr. Denton.

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, just with respect to that last point, I think our view is that given the discussions that have occurred with respect to the security measures in the SCIF and, frankly, the government's view that we defer entirely to what the CISO and the marshals believe is necessary, that's not something that would necessarily need to be addressed, and so a protective order that addressed the handling of classified information would supersede the other orders. But to the extent the Court wants us to make that clearer, we're happy to, as you said, take another stab at it.

THE COURT: All right. I certainly think you should make clear that it supersedes all prior protective orders, and you know the record better than I do, if there's any out there that it should not supersede, then you should make that clear.

But, Ms. Shroff, any comments on the government's proposed modification?

MS. SHROFF: Your Honor, we did discuss with the CISO this morning a proposal. We think that that proposal, if accepted by the government and implemented, it would really reduce any risk of a spill, and it would be hopefully more

efficient. Perhaps in a show of good faith, the CISO, the government, myself, and Mr. Schulte could meet. I think we could meet in a SCIF or in the Court's SCIF so that we could hash out the new proposal and see if we could submit a final CIPA protective order for the Court's consideration where the defendant is going pro se. And of course, it can be limited to this particular set of facts, which is very much an anomaly, where Mr. Schulte is pro se in a classified litigation. It's just a thought.

THE COURT: OK.

Mr. Schulte, anything you wish to say? Again, I'm happy to take that up. That was sort of the idea that was supposed to have happened before last Friday's deadline, but be that as it may, I'm happy to give you another stab at it.

THE DEFENDANT: Yeah. So like the proposed schedule, I didn't receive it until after the deadline, and so after I received it and I spoke with standby counsel about the government's proposal just today, so we just barely --

THE COURT: OK. So why don't we do this. I'll give you all until January 7 as well to try and make a joint submission and any tweaks or further modifications that you think are appropriate; I will definitely include the CISO in that discussion. I plan to consult him separately with respect to any modifications that he might suggest. I think it should make reference — among other things he and I discussed, right

now he's named in it, but none of his colleagues are, and I think it should either name them as well or provide for his associates, without specification, in some way that makes sense. But the bottom line is why don't you guys try again, and in the meantime, the existing protective orders will remain in effect, as they have been.

The next item is the motion regarding the classification review process. I meant to discuss this with Mr. Hartenstine before, and we didn't get to it, but the government submitted a proposal. This is at ECF No. 559. Mr. Schulte responded at ECF No. 604.

I do have two concerns about the government's proposal. One is it seems to be a step backwards. My understanding is that at least with respect to some documents, maybe court orders, that the current expectation is that a review process would be done within two weeks. I think the government is now proposing that everything be done within three, and the idea wasn't to make things worse; it was to make things better.

No. 2, I think Mr. Schulte's point is well-taken that not all filings are created equal; that is to say, there's a huge difference between a two-page letter and a 50-page brief. The former could be reviewed much more swiftly than the latter, and I think that having a single deadline of three weeks without regard for the length or nature of the submission is

not necessarily appropriate, and some sort of either scaled system or the like would make sense.

Mr. Denton, any thoughts about either of those?

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, I think we were honestly just going for ease of administrability on a deadline that we were assured by the classification authority we could hit without fail and have it be something across the board with an understanding that court orders would be prioritized and anything specified to be cleared within a shorter period of time. But that said, we're happy to sort of work with the constraints that the Court sees appropriate here.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you take those comments under advisement and maybe submit another proposal by January 7. And since you'll be discussing things with Mr. Hartenstine and Mr. Schulte, you can include that in your discussions as well. I think it probably would make sense to have -- I understand the argument for the ease of administrability, but it doesn't seem like it will be impossible -- and I want to make clear I don't think Mr. Schulte's proposal of having it be proportional to the length is the necessarily the way to go, but it seems like having a few different categories -- court orders, defense submissions of X length, defense submissions of greater than X length. But it might make sense to put it into those categories and have different lengths or presumptive lengths

for those. But again, it seems like there's a big difference between a two-page letter and a 25-, or 50-page brief.

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, I will say I think that is, by and large, true, but I would note that obviously a 25-page brief that addresses a single issue whether there's classified information in a limited different portion of it is a different matter than, for example, some of the ten-page letters that address almost entirely classified content. But we understand the Court's concern, and we'll talk with the classifying authorities and Mr. Hartenstine about a reasonable way to divide these up into buckets.

THE COURT: All right. And I'm not saying that my suggestion is the right one; I just think something that acknowledges that there is a bit of a sliding scale.

I'm not going to order the government to record all research, communication, and documentation with respect to the classification review process. Mr. Schulte cites no authority to support that request, and I'm aware of none.

As to the sealed ex parte or in camera documents, I'm not quite sure I understand, Mr. Schulte, what the issue is there or why I shouldn't require portion marking if they're going to be under seal or ex parte or in camera in their entirety. That seems like a gratuitous burden, but am I missing something?

THE DEFENDANT: I guess I'm a little confused. The

portion marking, obviously, when the government does its classification review that it should portion mark the material so I know what level it's classified at. That was the portion marking. And what specifically -- yeah, just to specifically note, maybe -- for example, if it's a long paragraph, it should note what parts are unclassified and which parts are classified and at what level they're classified as, so then I would know. Because basically depending on people's security clearance or something like that, you're just always supposed to know at what level something's classified as so you know how to communicate that and who you can communicate that to.

THE COURT: Mr. Denton, do you have any thoughts on that item?

MR. DENTON: Again, your Honor, I think our plan was to do exactly that for anything that would be filed publicly, but we were only saying, as your Honor noted, it seems like an unnecessary burden for documents filed either under seal or exparte.

THE COURT: All right. What about Mr. Schulte's point, which is well-taken, that he needs to know with whom he can share those documents.

MR. DENTON: So, we can certainly identify the level of classification for the documents. That's not an issue, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you do that, and the

hope is that that would suffice, and I agree that it seems like an unnecessary burden to portion mark those documents. But to the extent that there's a particular document that Mr. Schulte has an issue with, either because he wants to share it with someone or otherwise, then perhaps you can confer about that and you can provide more detailed information, as appropriate. But as a default, I don't think that should be required.

Mr. Denton, Mr. Schulte requests disclosure of what he refers to as the classification block that I guess has some information regarding who created it, who the classifying authority is, and so on. I confess I don't know enough about this to know what that refers to, but any issues there?

Or maybe Mr. Hartenstine can shed some light on that.

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, honestly, I think that's a conversation, a question we'd have to discuss a little more extensively with Mr. Hartenstine and with the classifying authorities. I'm not entirely sure what the sensitivities, if any, about that some of that are. So I know that when material is produced in classified discovery, that commonly is something that is redacted, so it may be that it's not an issue. I'm just not sure what the answer is.

THE COURT: All right. So why don't you take up, and since you'll be submitting a more refined proposal anyway, you can address that at the same time.

Mr. Schulte's reply renews the question of whether I

have authority and should exercise it to review the government's classification decisions. I will address that issue later in connection with Mr. Schulte's motion for reconsideration of my December 3 order, so I'll table that for the moment.

The next item is Mr. Schulte's desire to file additional motions. I had taken his prior letter, at ECF No. 587, to mean that he was listing the motions, the universe of motions that he sought to bring, but obviously that wasn't the case, and if I misunderstood, I apologize for that.

Let me start by saying I don't know if, and this is at ECF No. 630, Mr. Schulte is suggesting that the cases he cites, including, for instance, *Palmer* and *Todd*, stand for the proposition that a defendant is free to remake the same motions before a retrial, but I don't read those decisions that way.

I read them to stand for the proposition that law of the case does generally apply where, as here, there has been a mistrial and that the Court has discretion to decide whether and to what extent to revisit issues that were decided before the first trial. See, e.g., United States v. Todd, 920 F.2d 399, 403-04 (6th Cir. 1990). The cases also point to a distinction between rulings made by a court on formal motions versus rulings made on objections during trial, suggesting that trial courts should have ample flexibility to revisit objections during the heat of trial without regard to rulings

in an earlier proceeding. See, e.g., U.S. v. Palmer, 122 F.3d 215, 221 (5th Cir. 1997); United States v. Mann, 590 F.2d 361, 371 (1st Cir. 1978). Palmer, on which defendant relies most heavily, is not to the contrary. There, the Court of Appeals found waiver for failure to renew objections before a retrial, but only because "the trial court expressed in unambiguous terms that it would not automatically revive any of Palmer's pretrial motions. 122 F.3d at 221; see also United States v. Hoffecker, 530 F.3d 137, 166 (3d Cir. 2008), which reads Palmer in precisely that way. Thus, the cases stand for the proposition that I have discretion to adhere to Judge Crotty's rulings or to revisit them, as I wish, basically.

As an exercise of that discretion, I do not intend to revisit rulings that Judge Crotty made before the first trial and since the first trial. And I'm not saying that if I encounter an issue that if I think I should deal with differently I won't revisit it, but as a general matter, I adhere to his rulings with respect to substantive motions before the first trial and since that trial. The burdens imposed by the issues in this case are great enough without reconsidering de novo every decision that Judge Crotty made in this case. The interests in finality and narrowing the issues for retrial support adhering to these rulings. Thus,

Mr. Schulte need not renew those motions to preserve them for appeal. By contrast, I will not necessarily adhere to any

rulings on simple objections during trial or with respect to things like jury instructions, which is to say that the parties should and, to preserve them for appeal, must make any such objections that they think are appropriate without regard for rulings in the first trial.

Having said that, I'm inclined to let Mr. Schulte make the three new motions that he discusses in his letters. This is ECF Nos. 630 and 644 -- another example of sort of repetitive filings, Mr. Schulte -- first, there's a new CIPA 4 motion for basic access to backups; second is a new motion to preclude the government from introducing evidence from the digital forensic crime scene, and third is a motion to suppress specific documents seized from the MCC on the basis of attorney client privilege -- with the understanding that one of the issues that the parties may and indeed should brief in connection with those motions is whether Judge Crotty previously ruled on the issue. If I conclude that he did, I may deny the motion on that basis alone.

Any objections to that, Mr. Denton?

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, I think the only concern in particular is with respect to the first one, which is ostensibly styled as a CIPA Section 4 motion. Insofar as CIPA Section 4 authorizes the government to make an application to delete or withhold items from discovery, I think what this is is just a repackaging of the motion to compel that the

defendant has filed many times, that has been denied many times, and that is currently the subject of one appeal and one mandamus petition. So I think that one may stand in a little bit of a different category, but to the extent that those are points the Court wishes us to make in response to a submission, we're certainly happy to do it that way.

THE COURT: I guess to put it another way, I'm inclined to let Mr. Schulte raise the issues that he now identifies he wants to raise, and if I'm persuaded that Judge Crotty has ruled on them, I probably won't revisit them, and if I realize or discover that he has raised the issues on appeal, I may conclude that I don't have jurisdiction to address them at all. But it seems to me that the best thing is to develop the record on those issues and allow you to raise those issues in your opposition.

Mr. Schulte, any questions on your end? To be clear, I will, I think, adjust the deadlines for the filing of motions in light of that ruling. But any questions? That is to say, I'm granting your request to file those three motions, but I assume nothing further.

THE DEFENDANT: Thank you, Judge.

Just to be clear, the very first thing, regarding the Palmer case, I just wanted to put on the record I think everything's good there. And yeah, the CIPA 4, though, I'm pretty sure he miscited what that CIPA 4 is.

THE COURT: Mr. Schulte, you'll be able to raise it in your motion.

THE DEFENDANT: OK.

THE COURT: It doesn't sound like we have to discuss that further at this time, and again, I'll discuss the deadlines and page limits shortly.

Let me be clear, I said this in the endorsement authorizing you to file the other two motions, the time is coming to narrow the issues for retrial, not expand them. You have permission to file these five motions. As far as I'm concerned, that's basically it as to anything that is retrospective. If there are issues going forward, obviously that's a different story; that is to say, you're going to have to demonstrate good cause to raise any other motions, and good cause would be because they're dealing with ongoing issues or things that you should not have known about before. But you've now requested leave to file these five motions. I've granted that request, and that's it in terms of things that are backward-looking.

Do you understand that?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. Should we -- in my -- I did a proposal, too, of setting pretrial motion deadlines.

THE COURT: I said I would address that --

THE DEFENDANT: OK.

THE COURT: -- in a minute.

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THE DEFENDANT: All right.

THE COURT: All right.

The government made a request in its preconference letter to clarify the rules or default rules for motions. I certainly recognize -- and again, my hope is that this will begin to change going forward -- that there have been a lot of filings and that may be part of the cause of confusion or burden here, but I'm not sure I understand what the confusion is. It seems like there's a default, and if I don't issue an order specifying that an opposition should be filed in a different manner or timing, that that default would apply to anything filed as a motion or properly filed as a motion. But is there a need to clarify beyond that?

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, I think the only confusion is that some of the things that were being filed as motions seemed to fall within the category of retrospective things that the Court had indicated would not be considered, and so we're happy to go ahead and just respond to everything. But we were trying to figure out a little bit better whether we should be drawing a distinction between things that the Court should act on before we file a response or, again, whether the Court just wants us to respond to everything.

THE COURT: Well, let me say I don't think there's any confusion, and I think after today in particular, hopefully there will be less of an issue still. If there is, you're

welcome to file a letter and say, How would you like us to -we're going to respond to it in this fashion, if you'd like me
to handle it differently, then tell us, and I'm happy to tell
you if I think it should be handled differently, but it seems
to me I'm trying to simplify things, and hopefully it will
work.

MR. DENTON: I think, as your Honor suggested, it sounds like we're going to end up in a pretty holistic resolution today, but I think that should cover the government's concern.

THE COURT: All right. Great.

So then let's talk about dates and deadlines. By order, I had adjusted the trial date in light of Mr. Schulte's expert's conflict and moved it to June 13. Everyone should understand and treat that as a firm date. Obviously, recent events indicate that the pandemic is not quite behind us yet, so I can't predict what pandemic-type situations are going to be at that time, but barring the pandemic affecting things, you should treat that date as the day on which this case is going to trial. So what that means is if there's any issue that could affect our ability to start trial — I think speaking with a mask on for this long is definitely causing me to get something stuck in my throat, but I assure you that I don't have Covid.

In any event, what that means is that if there is any

issue that could affect our ability to start trial on June 13, it is incumbent upon you to raise it in a timely fashion. If you fail to do so, if you fail to raise something that you could have and should have raised at an earlier date that would affect our ability to start trial on June 13, you're probably not going to get whatever it is you think that you're entitled to, and your application may be denied on that basis alone. So I want to make sure everyone understands that.

Mr. Denton.

MR. DENTON: Understood, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Schulte.

THE DEFENDANT: Understood.

THE COURT: Ms. Shroff, I assume you and Ms. Colson understand.

MS. SHROFF: We understand, your Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

With respect to the pretrial schedule adopted by order entered on December 6 at ECF No. 628, the defendant,

Mr. Schulte, makes a proposal to make January 28 a deadline for the CIPA Section 4 notices and CIPA Section 10 notices.

Mr. Denton, do you have a response or view on that?

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, with respect to the Section
10 notice, that's fine. I'm not sure whether we're going to do
a supplemental one here or not. But that's perfectly fine.

With respect to the CIPA Section 4, again, I think

that may just make sense to roll together with the motions deadline, which is my understanding of what the defendant has also proposed for January 28.

THE COURT: All right. I am prepared to adopt that January 28 proposal for the CIPA Section 10 notices as well as for the pretrial motions deadline. That is what Mr. Schulte requests, and I'm happy to give it to him. By endorsement, I had extended the deadline for the previous two motions to January 7.

By the way, that endorsement contained a typo and inadvertently reduced the pages that Mr. Schulte had to brief on them. That was a mistake that, in any event, will be mooted by what I'm about to say. I would prefer to get a single set of motions rather than seriatim motions, so I'm going to extend the deadline for all five of these motions to January 28 to be supported by a single consolidated memorandum of law up to 55 pages; the government response by February 25, up to the same 55-page length, and any reply by March 11, not to exceed 20 pages. I recognize if there are delays and the like, that may require some adjustments of a couple days here and there, but my intention is to stick to those deadlines.

Any requests questions or objections?

Mr. Denton.

MR. DENTON: Not from the government, your Honor.

THE COURT: Mr. Schulte.

THE DEFENDANT: No objection.

THE COURT: All right. That concludes the case management-related things that I wanted to address.

We still have a lot of ground to cover, but we've also been going at this for a while.

Let me check with the court reporter.

All right. We're good. Let's carry on.

The next item on my agenda is the conditions of confinement-related issues. These are raised in a number of filings, ECF Nos. 590, 591, 605, 617, and 631.

Mr. Schulte raises a host of different issues. They run the gamut from access to the law library to things like removal of the basketball "goal," whatever that may be, from the recreation yard. Putting aside the merits of these complaints, there's a threshold question of whether I have authority even to entertain them. The answer to that question with respect to the vast majority of Mr. Schulte's complaints is that I do not. It is well established that, in general, federal pretrial detainees, such as Mr. Schulte, may only challenge their conditions of confinement in a civil action brought pursuant to a Bivens order in a Section 2241 habeas petition. See, e.g., United States v. Moi, 2021 WL 4048596, at *8 (D. Alaska, June 7, 2021) (citing cases). The one "exception to this rule is an inmate's challenges to conditions of confinement that impinge his or her ability to consult with

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counsel or exercise other trial rights." United States v. Yandell, 2020 WL 3858599, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 8, 2020) (citing cases); see also Moi, 2021 WL 4048596, at *8. To allow a criminal defendant to "file grievances in his criminal proceeding not directly related to his ability to exercise his rights in that proceeding would circumvent his obligation to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking redress in court." Moi, 2021 WL 4048596, at *8.

As Judge Crotty has noted repeatedly before, see ECF Nos. 453 and 526, the cases on which Mr. Schulte relies, see, e.g., ECF No. 631, to suggest otherwise do not call for a different conclusion. To the contrary, they reaffirm that the proper vehicle to challenge most conditions of confinement is a habeas petition pursuant to Section 2241. See, e.g., United States v. McGriff, 468 F.Supp.2d 445, 447 (E.D.N.Y. 2007); United States v. Bout, 860 F.Supp.2d 303, 307 n. 12, (S.D.N.Y. 2012). To be sure, the courts in those cases and others did entertain challenges to the conditions of confinement in the criminal cases -- treating them as petitions pursuant to Section 2241. I could do the same but for one fundamental problem: the law is clear that a Section 2241 petition challenging the conditions of confinement must be brought in the district of confinement, which, here, is in the Eastern District of New York. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 447 (2004); Goodall v. Von Blanckensee, 2019 WL 8165002, at *4

(S.D.N.Y. Jul. 19, 2019) (citing cases). The only case cited by Mr. Schulte that arguably comes close to doing otherwise or supporting his contention that I can exercise authority here is United States v. Khan, 540 F.Supp.2d 344 (E.D.N.Y. 2007), in which the district court dismissed a challenge to the conditions of confinement at the MCC, which is in this district, for lack of exhaustion without suggesting that, but for the lack of exhaustion, the court would have lacked authority to address it. But in the face of the case law holding that I do not have jurisdiction, that is hardly compelling authority suggesting that I do, since it dismissed the claims or the petition on other grounds.

In short, I cannot and I will not entertain any complaints with respect to the conditions of confinement unless they materially infringe upon the ability to consult with counsel, which doesn't really apply here, since Mr. Schulte is proceeding pro se, or the exercise of his trial rights. In applying that rule here, the vast majority of Mr. Schulte's complaints must be dismissed or disregarded, including the lighting conditions, sound conditions, and temperature in his cell; his solitary confinement; the monitoring of his cell by camera; the lack of a rubber guard on the window lid to his cell; his complaints about the quantity and quality of food and meals in the commissary; the lack of a comfortable chair; the lack of television in his cell; the lack of adequate access to

the regular -- that is, non-law -- library; restrictions on his phone usage and social visits; the fact that he is shackled when moved; the removal of the basketball goals, not to mention his complaints about the sink, toilet, shower, windows, and lockers. It is quite clear that none of these things, even together, rise to the level of infringing on Mr. Schulte's trial-related rights. They certainly have not inhibited him from zealously representing himself, as the sheer number of filings since the last conference that I held makes clear. Accordingly, I do not have jurisdiction to entertain those complaints, and I do not expect to see them in any future applications to me.

Now, there is, as far as I believe or can tell, only one condition-of-confinement issue over which I think I do have jurisdiction because it does relate to Mr. Schulte's trial rights; namely, access to the law library. The truth is that I would be on firm ground denying any relief there too because every court to consider the question, including the Second Circuit, has held that "the right to represent oneself in criminal proceedings, [though] protected by the Sixth Amendment, does not carry with it a right to state-financed library resources where state-financed legal assistance is available. Spates v. Manson, 644 F.2d 80, 84-85 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Tellier v. Reish, 164 F.3d 619 (2d Cir. 1998); Smith v. Hutchins, 426 F.App'x 785, 790 (11th Cir. 2011);

United States v. Byrd, 208 F.3d 592, 593 (7th Cir. 2000); and Benjamin v. Kerik, 102 F.Supp.2d 157, 163-64 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). Instead, any right of access to legal resources owed to pretrial detainees "is satisfied when the presiding courts merely offer such detainees appointed counsel or standby counsel." Stanko v. Patton, 2007 WL 1309701, at *2-3 (D. Neb. Mar. 28, 2007) (citing cases). Here, of course, the defendant has not one but two dedicated and very skilled standby counsel.

That said, I do think it is appropriate to ensure that Mr. Schulte has adequate time in the law library to prepare his case.

At ECF No. 590, he initially claimed that he had only one hour per day, but when the government responded, at ECF No. 591, that he actually has two hours per day, Mr. Schulte admitted that that was the case if he forewent his recreation time. He may not like that, but it is what it is, and it certainly doesn't rise to the level of a violation of his rights.

That said, I'm a little unclear from the record if the government's submission states that it will confer with the MDC and arrange for him to have ten hours per week, but according to Mr. Schulte, he only has time on the days when he is not brought to the courthouse to work in the SCIF and that even with the two hours per day, that doesn't come close to ten hours.

So, Mr. Denton, I don't know if you can clarify that or shed some light on, it but I wanted to ask you.

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, I think, first of all, I think it is correct that, as a general matter, he does not get that time on days when he is brought to the SCIF. That's something we're working on addressing. By and large, I think I would say that the government's posture is that we are mindful of the Court's orders that the defendant may need more of various accommodations as we get closer to trial in order to prepare, and we're working with the MDC on trying to figure out the best ways to do that. We don't have obvious answers yet because of the constraints of the SCIF productions and the defendant's status under SAMs, but it is something that we are conferring with the MDC about notwithstanding the law that your Honor cited.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you plan to update me in the letter of January 7 as well. I think access to the law library is important not only to prepare for trial but also given the schedule that I just imposed with the motions that are due by January 28, I think now is a critical time for that purpose too. If anything, he needs access to the law library more in connection with the preparation of motions than he does in preparation for the trial itself, so I think ensuring that the MDC understands that and trying to figure out a means by which he can get up to ten hours per week even with the SCIF

time probably makes sense. So if you can update me by January 7, but get in touch with them even before that so as to not lose the time between now and January 7, that would be great. All right?

MR. DENTON: Yes, your Honor.

THE COURT: Separately, Mr. Schulte, at ECF No. 623, raises issues with respect to problems with the computer and the keyboard in the law library. I assume that those issues have been or will be worked out, but they're not the kinds of things that I plan to involve myself in unless they rise to the level of materially affecting his trial-related rights, which, as far as I can tell, they plainly don't.

The bottom line is, Mr. Schulte, I'll try to ensure that you do get more time in the law library in the coming weeks as you prepare the motions that you wish to file. Beyond that, I don't intend to do anything with respect to the issues that you've raised regarding your conditions of confinement.

Anything you wish to say?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes. On the four main issues that I brought up regarding the sleep deprivation, the starvation, the freezing cold, and the loudspeakers, I think these do greatly affect my ability to assist at all in my case. For example, yesterday, I didn't get lunch at all. When I'm not fed, I don't have sustenance, I can't -- it's very difficult to work. The same with sleep deprivation. One of the reasons that I

leave early as well from the SCIF is that I'm so exhausted during the day. And these four issues are very, very critical to me that I think if you're not going to address them, I can no longer represent myself and I would be focusing my time on resolving those four issues because, Judge, I mean, it's not a joke. This is very difficult place to work when I can't even sleep. I can hardly get enough food. During the day, I'm starving all the time. I'm focusing all my time on these types of things instead of being able to work on my case. I think the Court is well within its jurisdiction to resolve these four issues, and like I said, if not, there's no way I can represent myself, if I can't have these issues resolved.

THE COURT: All right. If it gets to that point, you can certainly raise the issue and we'll address how to deal with it in your case, but as far as I can tell, that's demonstrably false. Since the last conference you have filed — honestly, I have lost track of how many things you have filed. But I think you have filed ten standalone motions alone. Frankly, it's a staggering amount of work product for anyone, but given the things that you're saying, it just defies credibility to say that you're unable to meaningfully work on your case, given the amount of things that you're producing and filing.

THE DEFENDANT: Just because I'm able to do these things and push myself and persevere, I don't think that's a

reason to say that I'm not adversely affected by these issues.

I mean -- I mean honestly --

THE COURT: Mr. Schulte.

THE DEFENDANT: -- be able to eat and not have --

THE COURT: Mr. Schulte, I understand.

THE DEFENDANT: -- and not be deprived of sleep, I don't see why the Court thinks that this is such a big deal that it can't, it honestly can't address. These are just humane issues. I mean I'm not asking for the moon on these four issues. I'm literally just asking for food, to sleep and not be freezing all the time.

THE COURT: Mr. Schulte, I have a filing from the government which seems to take a different issue of the way in which you've been treated. My point is I see no evidence that it is affecting your ability to prepare your case; that is my only authority to address in this case. Given that, I don't think these are issues that I can or should address, and I don't plan to address them, and I don't expect to see further filings on them. I think that you have other means by which to address them. As far as I can tell, you're able to and you may avail yourself of that. The government, for that reason it may be in their interest to try and address them with the MDC and try and ensure that some of these problems are addressed, and I would urge them to do that, but the bottom line is these are not issues that I have the authority to even address. So

that's the final word on the matter and that's my ruling on the matter.

With that, let's proceed to the next category. These are substantive motions, most of which I have rulings on, so let me proceed one by one on that.

The first is Mr. Schulte's motion for bail.

On October 21, the government filed its opposition; that's at ECF No. 562. Mr. Schulte filed his reply on November 13; ECF No. 588. The motion is denied substantially for the reasons set forth in the government's opposition.

First, to the extent that Mr. Schulte seeks to reopen the bail hearing, pursuant to Section 3142(f), he fails to demonstrate that there is information that "was not known to" him at the time of the earlier bail determination. Moreover, any such new information is not material, as there is overwhelming evidence supporting Judge Crotty's prior findings, made in the context of both the bail determination and his denial of Mr. Schulte's motion to lift the SAMs, that
Mr. Schulte poses a danger to the community, including, but not limited to, his commission of sexual assault, his receipt and possession of child pornography, evidence of his involvement in the sophisticated theft and dissemination of highly classified information, his violations of protective orders, and his continued disclosures and attempted disclosures of classified information, even from jail.

Mr. Schulte's argument that the length of his detention has become unconstitutionally excessive has more force, if only because he has now been detained for almost four years, which is indisputably a long time, and, absent bail, that time is likely to be much longer come trial. Again, as the Second Circuit noted in *United States v. El-Hage*, "the length of detention alone is not dispositive and will rarely by itself offend due process." 213 F.3d 74, 79 (2d Cir. 2000). Moreover, as in *El-Hage*, "the duration of the detention is not wholly unprecedented, especially for a complex case" -- that is from the same page, and this is certainly a complex case. Indeed, given the nature of the charges, the nature of the evidence, and the circumstances surrounding Mr. Schulte and his detention, it is among the most complex criminal proceedings that I am aware of.

In any event, the other three factors that a court must weigh under El-Hage -- (1) the extent of the prosecution's responsibility for delay of the trial, (2) the gravity of the charges, and (3) the strength of the evidence upon which detention was based -- i.e., the evidence of risk of flight and dangerousness; see 213 F.3d at 79 -- weigh against Mr. Schulte.

First, Mr. Schulte's assertions notwithstanding, the government is not responsible for the length of his pretrial detention. That is largely due to the extraordinary complexity of the case and the evidence and the procedures required by

CIPA; the pandemic, which not only delayed retrial but also hindered Mr. Schulte's ability to prepare for retrial; and Mr. Schulte's own perhaps inadvisable decision to go pro se.

Second, Mr. Schulte's casual assertions aside, the charges — both the espionage charges, which involve the alleged theft and dissemination of some of our nation's most closely guarded secrets and the child pornography charges — are exceptionally serious.

And finally, as I previously discussed, the strength of the evidence upon which detention was based — that is, the evidence of dangerousness — is overwhelming. And for what it's worth, that factor is not concerned with the strength of the evidence generally but with the strength of the evidence upon which detention was based. But even if the strength of the evidence were a concern, in this context and with the caveat that I'm just beginning to get my head around the full record in this case, the evidence in this case seems strong, even if it is largely circumstantial.

Accordingly, the motion for bail is denied.

Moving to the motion to dismiss Counts Three and Four, at ECF Nos. 597 and 599, Mr. Schulte's protestations to the contrary notwithstanding, his motion is a paradigmatic example of a motion that "raises a factual dispute that is inextricably intertwined with a defendant's potential culpability," which cannot be resolved on a Rule 12(b) motion. *United States v.*

Sampson, 898 F.3d270, 281 (2d Cir. 2018). Yes, there is an exception to that rule for when the government has made a full proffer of the evidence that it plans to present at trial. See Sampson at 282. But that exception is "extraordinarily narrow," and it does not apply here. That is from the same page. Contrary to Mr. Schulte's argument, the first trial does not constitute a full proffer within the meaning of the Sampson exception. For one thing, the charges are not identical in that they have been superseded and changed; for another, the government represents that it anticipates introducing additional evidence at the retrial. See Gov't Br. (ECF No. 586, at 9 n. 2).

Mr. Schulte's as-applied First Amendment challenge, meanwhile, is without merit. For one thing, he is arguably estopped from making the argument by his counsel's earlier concession that the Espionage Act may constitutionally apply to him. See ECF No. 284, at 8. But even without that concession, the argument is without merit, substantially for the reasons stated by the court in United States v. Kim, 808 F.Supp.2d 44, 57-57 (D.D.C. 2011). As that court explained in addressing a charge under Section 793(d): "By virtue of his security clearance, defendant was entrusted with access to classified national security information and had a duty not to disclose that information. He cannot use the First Amendment to cloak his breach of that duty." Id. at 57 of the court's opinion.

Finally, the defendant's argument -- made in a supplemental letter dated November 15, 2021, at ECF No. 599 -- that Count Three must be dismissed in light of Judge Crotty's Rule 29 decision is without merit, substantially for the reasons set forth in the government's reply at ECF No. 616.

Applying the Blockburger test, the relevant offense in the S2 indictment and Count Three in the S3 indictment do not qualify as the "same offense" for purposes of double jeopardy since each has an element that the other lacks. Moreover, Judge Crotty found that the evidence was insufficient only as to one theory of conviction -- relating to Hickok, ECF No. 581, at 25. He explicitly found that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the government's other theories for conviction.

Accordingly, the motion to dismiss must be denied.

I recognize that that leaves unresolved some clear disagreements between the parties — most prominently, whether information that is in the public domain can qualify as national defense information. I do not need to resolve that disagreement today, and it is better left to motions in limine and/or jury instructions when the record will be clear and the issues more crystallized.

Finally, in light of the fact that I granted

Mr. Schulte authorization to file a motion with respect to the alleged attorney-client privileged materials, I do not intend to address his arguments with respect to the malware article

being privileged since that is within the scope of the motions that he will be filing, and I'll defer it to that time.

In light of that decision, moving on to the next item, which is the CIPA Section 5 notice, ECF No. 595, in light of my denial of the motion to dismiss, Mr. Schulte's CIPA Section 5 notice is denied as moot in part and as premature in part.

That is, to the extent that he seeks to use certain exhibits in connection with his motion to dismiss, the request is obviously moot, the point of my prior ruling. To the extent that he seeks to use them at trial, I think it makes more sense to take the issue up with Mr. Schulte's other CIPA Section 5 issues, at which point the record will be clearer and more developed.

Accordingly, to the extent that Mr. Schulte seeks to use the evidence at trial, the request is denied without prejudice to renewal in conjunction with his comprehensive omnibus Section 5 requests that are due by the deadline that I previously set.

The next item is the order to show cause that I issued with respect to the cell phone search evidence. The government's submission is at ECF No. 615. Mr. Schulte's response is at 640. Upon review of those submissions, I conclude that there is no basis to suppress the fruits of the search of the cell phone. I conclude that this case is unlike Smith, the case that I had previously cited, for two significant reasons.

First, given that the government sought and obtained from Magistrate Judge Moses a warrant within hours of the initial seizure, the seizure itself was ratified by a judicial officer within a relatively short time. That addresses the Smith court's concern that delay "prevents the judiciary from promptly evaluating and correcting improper seizures, 967 F.3d at 205, and also reduces Mr. Schulte's legitimate possessory interest.

Second, I am persuaded — substantially for the reasons set forth in the government's memorandum — that the cell phone had independent evidentiary value, and thus, the government was entitled to retain it pending trial. The fact that, as Mr. Schulte argues in his reply, the government could have obtained the information provided by the phone from other sources or in other ways doesn't change the fact that it has independent evidentiary value. Smith's holding is limited to evidence that has no evidentiary value independent of the search of its contents. See 967 F.3d at 205, 209.

Accordingly, on both those grounds, *Smith* is distinguished and distinguishable.

Second, and in any event I'm persuaded the good faith exception would apply. Under that exception, "evidence obtained by officers in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant subsequently invalidated by a reviewing court is not generally subject to exclusion." *United States v. Leon*, 468

U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984) United States v. Raymonda, 780 F.3d 105, 118 (2d Cir. 2015). There is no dispute that the relevant facts were disclosed in the second warrant application that was granted by Magistrate Judge Cott, and that warrant was not "so facially deficient that reliance upon it [was] unreasonable." Raymonda, 780 F.3d at 118. Mr. Schulte does not cite, and I have not found, any case prior to Smith that would even plausibly suggest that the delayed search would be a basis for suppression, and Smith was decided after the second search and, by the way, also applied the good faith exception in its own right. Moreover, as discussed, even under Smith, it was reasonable to believe that the government was entitled to maintain the phone given its plausible independent evidentiary value.

The defendant's arguments pursuant to Rules 16 and 41 are without merit and rejected. Mr. Schulte's request to file a new motion to suppress the March 2017 search warrant is denied. That warrant was not executed, as I mentioned earlier, and while it certainly provides support for my decision that the fruits of the eventual search need not be suppressed, my decision does not depend on it. So any motion to suppress that warrant would be academic.

Ms. Colson, are you --

MS. COLSON: I'm sorry, your Honor. I have another application. I didn't understand that this would go on for so

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long. My apologies.
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THE COURT: All right.

MS. COLSON: Ms. Shroff is able to stay.

THE COURT: All right. Very good.

MS. COLSON: Thank you.

THE COURT: Why don't you step out, and I'll continue.

The next motion is the motion for internet access, ECF No. 557. That motion is denied. I do not dispute the importance of the internet in today's world or its desirability in conducting litigation and preparing for trial, but put simply, there is no authority for the proposition that pretrial detainees generally, or those who make the decision to represent themselves specifically, let alone those under SAMs, are entitled to such resources. To the contrary, the authority I cited earlier — Spates; Byrd; Benjamin; and so on — stand for the proposition that any right of access to legal resources owed to pretrial detainees "is satisfied when the presiding courts merely offer such detainees appointed counsel or standby counsel." Stanko, at *2-3, citing various cases.

Here, as I noted earlier, Mr. Schulte has been provided with not one but two highly qualified and dedicated standby counsel, who have full access to the internet and all it has to offer. Mr. Schulte's desire that they do nothing other than handle logistics is irrelevant. The fact of the matter is that he has access to them, and they're available to

him and they satisfy whatever rights he may have in that regard.

Moreover, as noted, he does have regular access to the law library, even if it's not as much as he would like; two full days of access to the SCIF per week, with expanded hours, pursuant to my prior order; and other accommodations that are not made for the average pretrial detainee. I would note as well that Judge Crotty clearly warned Mr. Schulte that going pro se is not a back door way to undermine the SAMs order or of obtaining access to information or resources to which he wasn't entitled, and Mr. Schulte specifically affirmed that he wanted to proceed pro se whether or not he was granted greater access and resources.

Finally, I would note that even without access to the internet, Mr. Schulte has, as I have said several times, been able to file a veritable flood of motions and other submissions, so many that I have lost count myself. See, e.g., United States v. Helbrans, 2021 WL 4778525, at *14-15 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 12, 2021) (rejecting then pro se defendants' contentions that they needed additional resources in order to prepare their defense for similar reasons).

In short, there is no right, under the First, Fifth or Sixth Amendments, to internet access for pretrial detainees generally or for *pro se* defendants specifically. And there are particularly good reasons -- given the nature of the charges

here, the history of the case, and the SAMs -- set forth in Judge Crotty's prior rulings on those issues not to allow Mr. Schulte internet access. So that motion is denied.

Next, I'll take up the motion for reconsideration in my order at ECF No. 622 regarding essentially ordering the government to declassify certain information. I said earlier that I would revisit that issue here, and I'll do that now.

I want to be clear, I'm not prepared to hold, at least at this juncture, that courts have no authority to review classification decisions of the executive branch. To the extent that some of the cases cited by the government in its letter on this issue, at ECF No. 619, holds or suggests that that is the case, it is hard to square with the fact that there are at least two contexts in which courts do have authority to review classification decisions; namely, cases challenging pre-publication review such as McGehee v. Casey, 718 F.2d 1137, 1148-49 (D.C. Cir. 1983), and FOIA cases, see, e.g., Halperin v. FBI, 181 F.2d 279, 289 (2d Cir. 1999); Weberman v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 490 F.Supp. 9, 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).

At the same time, I agree with the government that these contexts are very different than the context of this case, a criminal case governed by CIPA. See, e.g., ACLU v. Dep't of Just., 681 F.3d 61, 72 & n. 9 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that "procedures of CIPA contrast sharply with those of FOIA"). Moreover, I am inclined to agree with the government that CIPA

itself does not grant or contemplate judicial authority to declassify information that the executive branch has deemed classified. Indeed, the text and instruction of the act suggest to me pretty strongly that courts do not have that authority, at least as a matter of statute.

In my view, therefore, defendant would likely have to persuade me that declassification is necessary to protect his constitutional rights, and on the present record, he has not done so. For starters, I'm inclined to think that the comprehensive scheme established by CIPA adequately protects his Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights, including the right to due process and to present a defense, and of course, CIPA has been upheld repeatedly by courts against challenges to its constitutionality.

I suppose that could change as we get closer to trial and it becomes clear what evidence Mr. Schulte wishes to use and how he wishes to use it. Not for nothing, by that point, I will also have a better handle on what is classified and why and, thus, a better ability to assess the parties' competing arguments. But certainly at this point in the litigation, I do not think that Mr. Schulte has come close to making that showing.

Nor has he demonstrated that the First Amendment calls for reviewing the executive branch's classification determinations. He is not seeking to publish information that

the executive branch has deemed classified, in which case there is an established administrative review process to challenge classification decisions and the right to judicial review.

Instead, we are dealing here with court filings, and he cites, and I have found, no authority for the proposition that a party to litigation has a First Amendment right to file documents on the public docket, let alone to do so over the government's claim that they contain classified information. There is, of course, a First Amendment right of public access to judicial documents, but Mr. Schulte does not invoke it, and in any event, he himself has access to the classified information, so he has no standing to invoke that right.

In short, to the extent that I have authority to review or second-guess the executive branch's determinations of classification, on which I reserve judgment, I decline to exercise it at this stage of the litigation. That said, I do want to say and/or reiterate two things.

First, I agree with Mr. Schulte that some of the government's classification determinations are, at least on their face, a little hard to understand. For instance, information that the government has in prior filings portion marked as unclassified and information that is generally public, with some caveats, and I would strongly urge the government to be careful in its determinations and to ensure that information and filings are not being overclassified even

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if there is no bad faith in the government's determinations. I trust that the government will press the classifying authority on that point and make my views on it known.

I would also note that such overclassification does come at a cost not only with respect to public access, of course, but also it puts Mr. Schulte and standby counsel in an unenviable position. This reverts to the discussion we had earlier, but it is hard to know in some instances what is and isn't classified. I'm not sure that's always the case, and I reiterate that counsel and standby counsel and Mr. Schulte are to take more care on that front, but it does seem to me that there is occasionally a sort of trap -- not only for the unwary, but even the wary -- and that's not fair. undermines the force of the protective order and other orders of the Court, and it's hard to insist that Mr. Schulte and standby counsel take care not to file classified things publicly if it's impossible to tell ex ante what is and isn't classified. Again, that doesn't necessarily apply to everything that has been filed here, but I just want to underscore that.

So the bottom line is that I will not reconsider my prior order at this time. I may, however, revisit the issue later as we get closer to trial and I have a better understanding myself of what is and isn't classified and why, particularly if I conclude that it does infringe on

Mr. Schulte's right to a fair trial in some demonstrable way.

I believe that that resolves all of the outstanding pending motions. My intention is to issue a bottom-line order memorializing all of these rulings as well as the new deadlines and schedule and so forth so that everybody's on the same page with respect to that.

Any other issues?

Mr. Denton.

MR. DENTON: Your Honor, just for the record, with respect to the last point you made about the classification order, the government has shared the Court's previous order with the classifying authority and discussed your Honor's footnote in that, which made a number of these points at some length. We will also ensure that we also share the transcript of this proceeding and convey those concerns to them as well.

THE COURT: All right. I don't think the footnote was especially long, but I take your point nevertheless.

Mr. Schulte, anything else that you wish to raise?

I do want to discuss when we should reconvene, and obviously, there may be an application under the Speedy Trial Act, but anything aside from that?

THE DEFENDANT: I don't think so, no.

THE COURT: All right. I'd be inclined to reconvene in either mid-January or early February.

Mr. Denton, do you have a view on that?

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Act until February 14.

1 MR. DENTON: Not particularly, your Honor. It might make sense to do early February, after the defendant's motions 2 3 are filed, but I think the government's happy either way. 4 THE COURT: All right. I think that probably makes Why don't we plan to reconvene at 2:30 on Valentine's 5 sense. Day, February 14. 6 7 Does that work, Mr. Denton? 8 MR. DENTON: Yes, your Honor. 9 THE COURT: Mr. Hartenstine, does that work for you? 10 MR. HARTENSTINE: Yes, your Honor. That works for me. 11 THE COURT: All right. 12 Mr. Schulte, I assume it works for you. 13 Ms. Shroff, does that work for you? 14 MS. SHROFF: May I trouble you to just ask what day of the week that is? 15 16 THE COURT: Monday. 17 MS. SHROFF: That's fine. 18 THE COURT: All right. Monday, February 14, at 2:30. 19 Mr. Denton, is there an application under the Speedy 20 Trial Act? 21 MR. DENTON: Yes, your Honor. 22 In light of the complexity of the case and the need 23 for the defendant to prepare and file a variety of motions, the 24 government would move to exclude time under the Speedy Trial

THE COURT: Mr. Schulte, any objections?

THE DEFENDANT: No objection.

THE COURT: I will exclude time under the Speedy Trial Act between today and February 14, 2022. I find that the ends of justice served by excluding that time outweigh the interests of the defendant and the public in a speedy trial in view of the complexity of the case, the many different issues that we've discussed today that require further discussion, resolution, and the motions that Mr. Schulte is going to be preparing and filing on January 28.

I am assuming, in light of my rulings today, including, but not limited to, the conditions-of-confinement issues, my ruling on the substantive motions, my permission to Mr. Schulte to file additional motions and the setting of one deadline for the filing of omnibus motions, that there will be fewer filings between now and the next pretrial conference.

Obviously, Mr. Schulte, you're free to file things if you think that there is something that you should file, but I would just urge you to heed my admonition earlier and not repeat things from one submission in another just to ease the burden on counsel, standby counsel, the government, and me, and also just begin to be able to focus on preparing for trial.

With that, everybody stay safe and healthy, and happy holidays to everyone. We are adjourned. Thank you very much for your patience. (Adjourned)